One hypothesis to explain variation in vocal communication in animal species is that the complexity of the social group influences the group's vocal complexity. This social-complexity hypothesis for communication is also central to recent arguments regarding the origins of human language, but experimental tests of the hypothesis are lacking. This study investigated whether group size, a fundamental component of social complexity, influences the complexity of a call functioning in the social organization of Carolina chickadees, Poecile carolinensis. In unmanipulated field settings, calls of individuals in larger groups had greater complexity (more information) than calls of individuals in smaller groups. In aviary settings manipulating group size, individuals in larger groups used calls with greater complexity than individuals in smaller groups. These results indicate that social complexity can influence communicative complexity in this species.

Midazolam is a drug that creates temporary anterograde amnesia. In a within-subjects, double-blind experiment, participants studied a list of stimuli after receiving an injection of midazolam in one session and after receiving saline in another session. The lists consisted of three types of stimuli: words, photographs, and abstract pictures. Recognition memory was tested at the end of each session. Memory was reliably poorer in the midazolam condition than the saline condition, but this amnesic effect was significantly smaller for pictorial stimuli than for words and almost nonexistent for abstract pictures. We argue that the less familiar the stimulus, the less likely it is to be associated with an experimental context. These data bolster our claim that unitization increases the chances of episodic binding and that drug-induced amnesia prevents episodic binding regardless of unitization.

We tested whether interacting with a gun increased testosterone levels and later aggressive behavior. Thirty male college students provided a saliva sample (for testosterone assay), interacted with either a gun or a children's toy for 15 min, and then provided another saliva sample. Next, subjects added as much hot sauce as they wanted to a cup of water they believed another subject would have to drink. Males who interacted with the gun showed significantly greater increases in testosterone and added more hot sauce to the water than did those who interacted with the children's toy. Moreover, increases in testosterone partially mediated the effects of interacting with the gun on this aggressive behavior.

A system for nonverbally representing the approximate number of items in visual and auditory arrays has been documented in multiple species, including humans. Although many aspects of this approximate number system are well characterized, fundamental questions remain unanswered: How does attention select which items in a scene to enumerate, and how many enumerations can be computed simultaneously? Here we show that when presented an array containing different numbers of spatially overlapping dots of many colors, human adults can select and enumerate items on the basis of shared color and can enumerate approximately three color subsets from a single glance. This three-set limit converges with previously observed three-item limits of parallel attention and visual short-term memory. This suggests that participants can select a subset of items from a complex array as a single individual set, which then serves as the input to the approximate number system.

Disoriented 4-year-old children use a distinctive container to locate a hidden object, but do they reorient by this information? We addressed this question by testing children's search for objects in a circular room containing one distinctive and two identical containers. Children's search patterns provided evidence that the distinctive container served as a direct cue to a hidden object's location, but not as a directional signal guiding reorientation. The findings suggest that disoriented children's search behavior depends on two distinct processes: a modular reorientation process attuned to the geometry of the surface layout and an associative process linking landmarks to specific locations.

We introduce a new paradigm to assess how children's choices for the future are influenced by their current desires. Forty-eight 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were assigned to one of four conditions. In two of these conditions (intervention), we manipulated children's current state of thirst by allowing them to eat pretzels. In the remaining two conditions (baseline), we did not give them pretzels. The children were then asked to choose between water and pretzels. In one intervention and one baseline condition, they chose what they would like "now," whereas in the other intervention and baseline conditions, they chose what they would like "tomorrow." Results revealed that, despite children's overwhelming desire for pretzels in the baseline conditions, children in both intervention conditions chose water. The data support the notion that children's current state influences not only their choices for the present, but also their choices for the future. We discuss this finding in terms of both cognitive-developmental and adult social-cognitive theory.

Few studies have investigated how physical and social facial cues are integrated in the formation of face preferences. Here we show that expression differentially qualifies the strength of attractiveness preferences for faces with direct and averted gaze. For judgments of faces with direct gaze, attractiveness preferences were stronger for smiling faces than for faces with neutral expressions. By contrast, for judgments of faces with averted gaze, attractiveness preferences were stronger for faces with neutral expressions than for smiling faces. Because expressions can differ in meaning depending on whether they are directed toward or away from oneself, it is only by integrating gaze direction, facial expression, and physical attractiveness that one can unambiguously identify the most attractive individuals who are likely to reciprocate one's own social interest.

People often draw trait inferences from the facial appearance of other people. We investigated the minimal conditions under which people make such inferences. In five experiments, each focusing on a specific trait judgment, we manipulated the exposure time of unfamiliar faces. Judgments made after a 100-ms exposure correlated highly with judgments made in the absence of time constraints, suggesting that this exposure time was sufficient for participants to form an impression. In fact, for all judgments—attractiveness, likeability, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness—increased exposure time did not significantly increase the correlations. When exposure time increased from 100 to 500 ms, participants' judgments became more negative, response times for judgments decreased, and confidence in judgments increased. When exposure time increased from 500 to 1,000 ms, trait judgments and response times did not change significantly (with one exception), but confidence increased for some of the judgments; this result suggests that additional time may simply boost confidence in judgments. However, increased exposure time led to more differentiated person impressions.

What information is used for sorting pictures of complex stimuli into categories? We applied a reverse correlation method to reveal the visual features mediating categorization in humans and baboons. Two baboons and 6 humans were trained to sort, by species, pictures of human and baboon faces on which random visual noise was superimposed. On ambiguous probe trials, a human-baboon morph was presented, eliciting "human" responses on some trials and "baboon" responses on others. The difference between the noise patterns that induced the two responses made explicit the information mediating the classification. Unlike the humans, the baboons based their categorization on information that closely matched that used by a theoretical observer responding solely on the basis of the pixel similarities between the probe and training images. We show that the classification-image technique and principal components analysis provide a method to make explicit the differences in the information mediating categorization in humans and animals.

Recognizing individual faces outside one's race poses difficulty, a phenomenon known as the other-race effect. Most researchers agree that this effect results from differential experience with same-race (SR) and other-race (OR) faces. However, the specific processes that develop with visual experience and underlie the other-race effect remain to be clarified. We tested whether the integration of facial features into a whole representation—holistic processing—was larger for SR than OR faces in Caucasians and Asians without life experience with OR faces. For both classes of participants, recognition of the upper half of a composite-face stimulus was more disrupted by the bottom half (the composite-face effect) for SR than OR faces, demonstrating that SR faces are processed more holistically than OR faces. This differential holistic processing for faces of different races, probably a by-product of visual experience, may be a critical factor in the other-race effect.

Disoriented children can use geometric information in combination with featural information to reorient themselves in large but not in small spaces; somewhat similar effects have been found in nonhuman animals. These results call for an explanation. We trained young chicks to reorient to find food in a corner of a small or a large rectangular room with a distinctive featural cue (a blue wall)—a task similar to that used with children. Then we tested the chicks after displacement of the feature to an adjacent wall. In the large enclosure, chicks chose the corner that maintained the correct arrangement of the featural cue with respect to sense, whereas in the small enclosure, they chose the corner that maintained the correct metrical arrangement of the walls with respect to sense. On the basis of these findings, we propose a simple model that can explain the effects of room size on spatial reorientation.

The distinction between central and peripheral cues has played an important role in understanding the functional nature of visual attention for the past 30 years. In the present article, we propose a new taxonomy that is based on linguistic categories of spatial relations. Within this framework, spatial cues are categorized as either "projective" or "deictic." Using an empirical diagnostic, we demonstrate that the word cues above, below, left, and right express projective spatial relations, whereas arrow cues, eye-gaze cues, and abrupt-onset cues express deictic spatial relations. Thus, the projective-versus-deictic distinction crosscuts the more traditional central-versus-peripheral distinction. The theoretical utility of this new distinction is discussed in the context of recent evidence suggesting that a variety of central cues can elicit reflexive orienting.

The contributions of different monocular depth cues to performance of a scene perception task were investigated in 4 pigeons. They discriminated the sequential depth ordering of three geometric objects in computer-rendered scenes. The orderings of these objects were specified by the combined presence or absence of the pictorial cues of relative density, occlusion, and relative size. In Phase 1, the pigeons learned the task as a direct function of the number of cues present. The three monocular cues contributed equally to the discrimination. Phase 2 established that differential shading on the objects provided an additional discriminative cue. These results suggest that the pigeon visual system is sensitive to many of the same monocular depth cues that are known to be used by humans. The theoretical implications for a comparative psychology of picture processing are considered.

The present research demonstrates that the extent to which people appreciate the influence past visceral states have had on behavior (e.g., the influence hunger has had on food choice) depends largely on their current visceral state. Specifically, we found that when people were in a hot state (e.g., fatigued), they attributed behavior primarily to visceral influences, whereas when people were in a cold state (e.g., nonfatigued), they underestimated the influence of visceral drives and instead attributed behavior primarily to other, nonvisceral factors. This hot-cold empathy gap was observed when people made attributions about the past behavior of another person or themselves, and proved difficult to overcome, as participants could not correct for the biasing influence of their current visceral state when instructed to do so. These different attribution patterns also had consequences for people's satisfaction with their performance. Those who attributed their poor performance to visceral factors were more satisfied than those who made dispositional attributions.