We examined whether identifying with a film character who smokes increases implicit associations of the self with smoking. Undergraduate men were randomly assigned to view film clips in which the male protagonist either smoked or did not smoke. We measured subsequent levels of self-smoking associations using a reaction time task, as well as self-reported beliefs about smoking and smokers. Greater identification with the smoking protagonist predicted stronger implicit associations between the self and smoking (for both smokers and nonsmokers) and increased intention to smoke (among the smokers). Stronger implicit self-smoking associations uniquely predicted increases in smokers' intentions to smoke, over and above the effects of explicit beliefs about smoking. The results provide evidence that exposure to smoking in movies is causally related to changes in smoking-related thoughts, that identification with protagonists is an important feature of narrative influence, and that implicit measures may be useful in predicting deliberative behavior.

Although controversy surrounds the relative authenticity of discontinuous versus continuous memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), little is known about whether such memories differ in their likelihood of corroborative evidence. Individuals reporting CSA memories were interviewed, and two independent raters attempted to find corroborative information for the allegations. Continuous CSA memories and discontinuous memories that were unexpectedly recalled outside therapy were more likely to be corroborated than anticipated discontinuous memories recovered in therapy. Evidence that suggestion during therapy possibly mediates these differences comes from the additional finding that individuals who recalled the memories outside therapy were markedly more surprised at the existence of their memories than were individuals who initially recalled the memories in therapy. These results indicate that discontinuous CSA memories spontaneously retrieved outside of therapy may be accurate, while implicating expectations arising from suggestions during therapy in producing false CSA memories.

 

Animals of many species use the geometric shape of an enclosed rectangular environment to reorient, even in the presence of a more informative featural cue. Manipulating the rearing environment affects performance on spatial tasks, but its effect on the use of geometric versus featural navigational cues is unknown. Our study varied the geometric information available in the rearing environment (circular vs. rectangular rearing tanks) of convict cichlids (Archocentrus nigrofasciatus) and tested their use of navigational cues. All the fish used geometric information to navigate when no features were present. When features were present, the fish used geometric and featural information separately. If cues were in conflict, fish raised in a circular tank showed significantly less use of geometric information than fish raised in a rectangular tank. Thus, the ability to use geometry to navigate does not require exposure to angular geometric cues during rearing, though rearing environment affects the dominance of featural and geometric cues.

This experiment tested the ability of 81 adult subjects to make a decision on a simple nonverbal false-belief reasoning task while concurrently either shadowing prerecorded spoken dialogue or tapping along with a rhythmic shadowing track. Our results showed that the verbal task, but not tapping, significantly disrupted false-belief reasoning, suggesting that language plays a key role in working theory of mind in adults, even when the false-belief reasoning is nonverbal.

Research Aritcles

In two experiments, we investigated whether 13-month-old infants expect agents to behave in a way that is consistent with information to which they have been exposed. Infants watched animations in which an animal was either provided information or prevented from gathering information about the actual location of an object. The animal then searched successfully or failed to retrieve the object. Infants' looking times suggest that they expected searches to be effective when—and only when—the agent had had access to the relevant information. This result supports the view that infants possess an incipient metarepresentational ability that permits them to attribute beliefs to agents. We discuss the viability of more conservative explanations and the relation between this early ability and later forms of theory of mind that appear only after children have become experienced verbal communicators.

Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
V. Southgate, A. Senju, and G. Csibra (View AbstractClose Abstract)

Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to other individuals. Yet the overwhelming consensus has been that children of this age are unable to attribute false beliefs. In the current study, we used an eyetracker to record infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. Our data demonstrate that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipate an actor's actions when these actions can be predicted only by attributing a false belief to the actor.

Parents of 162 infants ages 6 to 20 months modeled subsets of four of the same set of eight behaviors, each for a maximum of 3 min, and encouraged their infants to imitate. Proportions of infants producing each behavior (a) when it was modeled and (b) during modeling of a different behavior were compared to estimate the age at which infants mimicked each kind of behavior. No reproduction of these motor acts—that is, no mimicry—was observed at 6 months. Mimicry appeared to develop slowly through most of the 2nd year, emerging at different ages for different behaviors. The findings suggest that newborns' behavioral matching may not be continuous with mimicry later in infancy. Imitation is probably not one behavioral competency with one underlying mechanism. It is more likely a category of different ways of combining and using different types of knowledge, some of which develop across the first 2 years of life.

People consider the mental states of other people to understand their actions. We evaluated whether such perspective taking is culture dependent. People in collectivistic cultures (e.g., China) are said to have interdependent selves, whereas people in individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States) are said to have independent selves. To evaluate the effect of culture, we asked Chinese and American pairs to play a communication game that required perspective taking. Eye-gaze measures demonstrated that the Chinese participants were more tuned into their partner's perspective than were the American participants. Moreover, Americans often completely failed to take the perspective of their partner, whereas Chinese almost never did. We conclude that cultural patterns of interdependence focus attention on the other, causing Chinese to be better perspective takers than Americans. Although members of both cultures are able to distinguish between their perspective and another person's perspective, cultural patterns afford Chinese the effective use of this ability to interpret other people's actions.

This study explored the within-person dynamic organization of emotion in East-Asian Canadian bicultural individuals as they function in two cultural worlds. Using a diary design, we examined under what conditions their emotional structure resembles that of Westerners or that of East Asians. As predicted, when these bicultural individuals identified with a Western culture or had recently spoken a non-Asian language, their positive and negative affect were inversely associated. When they identified with an Asian culture or interacted in an Asian language, this inverse association disappeared. This study shows that as bicultural individuals identify and communicate with members of one or the other cultural group, they may adopt a culturally congruent phenomenology, including a distinct affective pattern.

An experience-sampling study of 124 undergraduates, pretested on complex memory-span tasks, examined the relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and the experience of mind wandering in daily life. Over 7 days, personal digital assistants signaled subjects eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts had wandered from their current activity, and to describe their psychological and physical context. WMC moderated the relation between mind wandering and activities' cognitive demand. During challenging activities requiring concentration and effort, higher-WMC subjects maintained on-task thoughts better, and mind-wandered less, than did lower-WMC subjects. The results were therefore consistent with theories of WMC emphasizing the role of executive attention and control processes in determining individual differences and their cognitive consequences.

Does visual working memory represent a fixed number of objects, or is capacity reduced as object complexity increases? We measured accuracy in detecting changes between sample and test displays and found that capacity estimates dropped as complexity increased. However, these apparent capacity reductions were strongly correlated with increases in sample-test similarity (r = .97), raising the possibility that change detection was limited by errors in comparing the sample and test, rather than by the number of items that were maintained in working memory. Accordingly, when sample-test similarity was low, capacity estimates for even the most complex objects were equivalent to the estimate for the simplest objects (r = .88), suggesting that visual working memory represents a fixed number of items regardless of complexity. Finally, a correlational analysis suggested a two-factor model of working memory ability, in which the number and resolution of representations in working memory correspond to distinct dimensions of memory ability.

In economics and political science, the theoretical literature on social choice routinely highlights worst-case scenarios and emphasizes the nonexistence of a universally best voting method. Behavioral social choice is grounded in psychology and tackles consensus methods descriptively and empirically. We analyzed four elections of the American Psychological Association using a state-of-the-art multimodel, multimethod approach. These elections provide rare access to (likely sincere) preferences of large numbers of decision makers over five choice alternatives. We determined the outcomes according to three classical social choice procedures: Condorcet, Borda, and plurality. Although the literature routinely depicts these procedures as irreconcilable, we found strong statistical support for an unexpected degree of empirical consensus among them in these elections. Our empirical findings stand in contrast to two centuries of pessimistic thought experiments and computer simulations in social choice theory and demonstrate the need for more systematic descriptive and empirical research on social choice than exists to date.

Even with ample time and opportunity to use extensive data, people often make do with small samples, which increases their risk of making the wrong decision. A theoretical analysis indicates, however, that when the decision involves continually selecting among competing, adaptive agents who are eager to be selected, an error-prone evaluation may be beneficial to the decision maker. In this case, the chance of an error can motivate competitors to exert greater effort, improving their level of performance—which is the prime concern of the decision maker. This theoretical argument was tested empirically by comparing the effects of two levels of scrutiny of performance. Results show that minimal scrutiny can indeed lead to better performance than full scrutiny, and that the effect is conditional on a bridgeable difference between the competitors. We conclude by pointing out that small-sample-based, error-prone decisions may also maintain competition and diversity in the environment.

In the present work, we investigated whether an auditory peripersonal space exists around the hand and whether such a space might be extended by a brief tool-use experience or by long-term experience using a tool in everyday life. To this end, we studied audio-tactile integration in the space around the hand and in far space, in blind subjects who regularly used a cane to navigate and in sighted subjects, before and after brief training with the cane. In sighted subjects, auditory peripersonal space was limited to around the hand before tool use, then expanded after tool use, and contracted backward after a resting period. In contrast, in blind subjects, peri-hand space was immediately expanded when they held the cane but was limited to around the hand when they held a short handle. These results suggest that long-term experience with the cane induces a durable extension of the peripersonal space.

article presents the first systematic test of the attention-allocation model for alcohol-related aggression. According to this model, alcohol has a "myopic" effect on attentional capacity that presumably facilitates aggression by focusing attention on more salient provocative, rather than less salient inhibitory, cues in hostile situations. Aggression was assessed using a laboratory task in which mild electric shocks were received from, and administered to, a fictitious opponent. Study 1 demonstrated that a moderate-load cognitive distractor suppressed aggression in intoxicated subjects (to levels even lower than those exhibited by a placebo control group). Study 2 assessed how varying the magnitude of a distracting cognitive load affected aggression in the alcohol and placebo conditions. Results indicated that the moderate-load distraction used in Study 1 (i.e., holding four elements in sequential order in working memory) suppressed aggression best. Cognitive loads of larger and smaller magnitudes were not successful in attenuating aggression.